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UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA 
LMEC-IM 2011/2012 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE I.C. 
PARTIAL  EXAM 
This is a closed books exam: you can use a calculator only. You 
are allowed 1h to complete the exam.  
 
MULTIPLE CHOICES (1 POINT EACH FOR A TOTAL OF 20 POINTS) 
 
 
 
1) Which kind of solution to agency costs of public companies can Leveraged Buyouts more typically 
be linked to?   
a) market for managers 
b) disciplining role of debt in reducing agency costs from free cash flows  
c) two-tier boards 
d) monitoring by active investors 
 
2) In US listed firms with dispersed ownership structures agency problems originated by the 
separation of ownership from control are partially reduced mainly thanks to: 
a) the threat of hostile takeovers 
b) monitoring by small shareholders 
c) monitoring by the board of directors 
 
3) What allowed private equity funds to acquire companies at relatively higher market multiples 
(higher EV/Ebitda ratio): 
a) higher leverage ratios used in the acquisitions  
b) lower leverage ratio used in the acquisitions 
c) better economic prospects than in the past 
 
4)As far as stock options, the backdating practice consists in: 
a) anticipating  the exercise date in a day when the stock price is higher 
b) choosing an exercise date when the stock price is lower than the current price 
c) choosing a grant date before the actual grant date if  the stock price was lower  
 
5)The Sarbanes-Oxley Act established a new agency (PCAOB) aimed to control: 
a) company’s insiders 
b) investment banks 
c) financial Analysts 
d) auditors of US companies 
e) CFOs 
 
6) Among other, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has: 
a) forbidden insiders to trade on their firm’s shares  
b) substituted IAS accounting principles with GAAPs accounting principles 
c) introduced mandatory rotation for auditors  
 
 
Name:    
ID number:   
Date:    Decembr 19th,2011 
2 
 
7) If the quorum to approve proposals in an Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting (ESM) is 2/3, and 
the largest shareholder has a 40% stake, which is the “hostile” stake that would allow a second 
shareholder to block any decision of the first shareholder in the ESM?  
a) 33.3% 
b) 15% 
c) 20%  
 
8) A firm has 1 mln of voting shares and 1 mln of non-voting shares with no-dividend differences. 
Assuming the market prices are respectively 4 euros for voting shares and 2 euro for non-voting 
shares. Which should be the approximate market reaction for the voting shares to the announcement of 
a 1:1 coercive dual class unification? 
a) -33% 
b) -25% 
c) -50% 
d) No reaction 
 
9) According to the “Interest Group theory” on financial development: 
a) cross-countries difference in financial development do not change considerably over time 
b) opposition by incumbent will be weaker if an economy is opened only to capital flows 
c) opposition by incumbent will be weaker if an economy is opened  to both capital and trade 
flows 
 
10) Which is the minimum percentage of voting shares which requires its communication to the 
Italian Regulator (Consob) introduced by the 1998 Draghi Law? 
a) 5% 
b) 10% 
c) 2% 
 
11) What is the right of withdrawal or right to step out?  
a) the right to sell the shares to the bidder when the company is taken over and the bidder 
overcome a given threshold 
b) the right to step out of the company if non-voting shares are converted into voting shares 
c) the right to step out of the company and being paid out if one shareholder does not agree on a 
relevant extraordinary decision taken by the general meeting  
 
12) What is the dual-class voting procedure (adopted also in Italy for dual-class firms):  
a) a voting procedure that sums up the voting outcome of two different voting classes of shares 
b) a voting procedure that requires the approval of two different classes of shareholders  
c) a voting procedure that allows one class of shares to vote also in the shareholders’ meeting of 
the other class  
 
13) Among others, the Market Abuse Directive has forbidden: 
  a) Insiders to trade their shares 
  b) The CEOs to have more than 100,000€ in stock options 
  c) The CFOs to know market expectations 
  d) Anyone to manipulate the security price by spreading false information 
 
14) What is the “sell-out” right in takeover regulations? 
 a) The right of firing the management 
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 b) The right of the holder of securities to sell all his shares to a third party outside the  
 company 
 c) The right of the holder of the remaining securities to require the offeror to buy his   
 securities 
 d) The right of the bidder who has acquired a very large part of the share capital to        
acquire the remaining outstanding shares 
 
15) Which of the following statements is true for the Equal Opportunity Rule (where “efficient” is 
meant in the Bebchuck’s definition)? 
 a) only “inefficient” control-transfers take place 
 b) efficient” control-transfers cannot take place 
 c) only “efficient” transaction can take place but many efficient transaction cannot take place 
 
16) According to the EU Takeover directive, what is the definition of “company control”: 
 a) The ownership of at least 50 percent +1 of the total number of shares of each class 
 b) The ownership of at least 50 percent +1 of the total number of voting shares 
 d) The decision is left to each member state  
 e) The ownership of at least 30 percent of the total number of voting shares 
 
17) Which of the following statements is a goal of the Passivity Rule? 
 a) Increasing the welfare of the management 
 b) Facilitating takeover activity 
 c) Preventing the management from investing in bond of others companies 
 d) Increasing the price of being active in the market 
 
18) The LBO operation reported in the movie “Barbarians at the gates” to which kind of solutions to 
agency costs can mostly be referred to among those proposed below: 
 a) Incentive schemes to the top manager 
 b) market for corporate control 
 c) market for managers 
 d) monitoring by active investors 
 
19) According to the EU Takeover directive, which of these regulations must be always introduced by 
single country?: 
 a) break-through rule 
 b) passivity rule 
 c) reciprocity rule 
 c) None of these  
  
 
20) Which of the following has been a widely used antitakeover device in US? 
a) dual class unifications 
b) equity offerings 
c) dual class creation 
d) leverage reduction 
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SHORT EXERCISES (2 POINTS EACH FOR A TOTAL OF 10 POINTS) 
 
 
1) A EU-country’s takeover regulation has set 33.3% of votes as the threshold for control definition 
which triggers the Equal Opportunity Rule. The majority shareholder of a listed company decides to 
sell his 40% controlling stake to a new owner for a price equal to 120 millions.  40 of the 120 millions 
is the value of the private benefits of the old owner charged to the new owner and paid in the 
transaction as a control premium.  
a) Which is the total value of the company (Mkt value and Private Benefits) under the old owner? 
b) Which is the % of shares the new owner is obliged to make an offer for?   
c)And which is the total value of the tender offer the new owner will have to make?  
 
a) 120-40 = 80 = mkt value of the 40% stake, hence Mkt value = (80*2.5= 200) and Total value = 
M +PBold = 200+40=240   
b) 100%, that is the remaining 60%.  
c) The total value of the tender offer under the EOR will have to be 120 x 2.5 = 300 (ok also if you 
have referred only to the floated share, then it would be 60% of 300= 180) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Still referred to the previous case: 
a) How much will the new owner end up paying (overall) for the private benefits of the old owner?  
b) If the new owner will enjoy the same amount of private benefits, which is the absolute and 
percentage increase in the market value of the firm that he should be able to obtain thanks to a 
better managerial action in order to break even with the price paid? 
 
 
a) 1/α x Bold = 1/0.4 x 40 = 2.5 x 40= 100 
b) Delta W = (1-α)/α ·Bold= 1.5· 40= 60 (also equal to 300-240);   
% of total value = +60/240 = + 25%;  
% of Mkt value = +60/200=30%  
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3) Given the below ownership structure:  
a) which is the percentage ownership (OWN) of cash flows by firm A in firm E?  
b) Which is the percentage of votes controlled in company E by the ultimate shareholder 
(CONTROL)?  
c) Which is the value of the index for the separation of ownership from control (O/C) of  firm A with 
respect to firm E? (Assume 1 Share 1 vote in all companies). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) OWN= 60%*10%+ 50%*15%+ 50%*20% + 50%*50%*20%= 28.5% 
b) CONTROL= 10%+15%+20% = 45%  
c) O/C=  28.5%/45% = 0.633 
 
 
 
4) A family (the ultimate controlling shareholder) owns 20% of Company A’s cash flows. On its turn, 
Company A owns 50% of Company B’s cash flows.  Company B decides to acquire 80% of another 
company (Company C) by paying 20 million more than its fair value. The ultimate controlling 
shareholder expects to extract from company C an amount of private benefits equal to 7 millions. 
Which is the overall gain or loss for the ultimate shareholder? 
 
Since the it was not clear from the text if the fair value was referred to the whole firm or to the stake, two answers have 
been considered as valid: 
 
Answer 1) 80% x -20 mln x 20% (own of A) x 50% (A’s Own of B)   + 7 mln = -1.6+7 mln = +5.4 
 
Answer 2) -20 mln x 20% (own of A) x 50% (A’s Own of B)   + 7 mln = 5 mln 
 
 
5) A family controls 60% of the voting shares of company B which, on its turn, controls the 30% of 
the voting shares of company C. Determine: 
a) the ownership of cash flows of the ultimate shareholder (the family) over company C and the 
ownership/Control ratio (O/C) 
b) find the same results of point a) assuming also that both company B and company C are dual 
class firms and have their equity equally split between voting shares and non-voting shares 
(assuming that non-voting shares are held only by retail shareholders) 
 
a) Ownership = 0.6x0.3 = 0.18 = 18%;  O/C = 18%/30% = 0.6 
b) Ownership = 0.6x0.5x0.3x0.5 = 0.045 = 4.5%  O/C = 0.15 
A
B C 
E
D 
60% 50%
10%
15%
50%
50% 
 20%
